Francisco Antonio

Junior Smart Contract Security Researcher

I am an independent security researcher from Brazil focused on Solidity, DeFi accounting, EVM internals, bridges, cross-chain systems, and reproducible proof-of-concept testing. I also build AI security tooling for prompt-injection detection, security telemetry classification, and LLM-assisted research workflows.

  • Solidity
  • Foundry
  • DeFi Security
  • EVM Internals
  • Precompiles
  • Cross-chain Accounting
  • AI Security Tooling

About

I am an 18-year-old independent security researcher from Brazil. I am self-taught, and I treat that as a working method rather than a gap: instead of credentials, I rely on practical proof — deep manual code review, local reproduction, Foundry test suites, Go unit tests, and detailed technical writeups.

My process is built around reproducibility. When I investigate a protocol or an execution environment, I compile it from source, run it locally, write tests around the exact behavior in question, and document every step so the work can be verified independently. If I cannot reproduce it, I do not claim it.

I am strongest in written technical English and async-first research. I am actively improving my spoken English and can comfortably handle prepared calls, written reports, and detailed technical follow-ups.

location
Brazil (UTC−3)
languages
Portuguese (native) · English (strong written, improving spoken)
working_style
Async-first · deep written reports · prepared calls
open_to
Junior researcher · apprentice auditor · internship · contractor · trial-based audit work

Core Skills

[01] smart_contract_security

Smart Contract Security

  • Solidity
  • Foundry
  • DeFi accounting
  • Vaults
  • Bridges
  • Oracle / accounting assumptions
  • Share-price logic
  • Invariant reasoning

[02] evm_infrastructure

EVM / Infrastructure Research

  • EVM constructor behavior
  • Precompiles
  • CREATE2
  • SELFDESTRUCT / EIP-6780
  • Local chain reproduction
  • Go unit tests
  • Cosmos EVM research

[03] ai_security

AI Security Research

  • Prompt injection detection
  • LLM guardrails
  • Security datasets
  • ModernBERT fine-tuning
  • SecOps classifiers
  • LLM-assisted vulnerability research

Featured Security Case Studies

Makina — Phantom AUM and LP Value Extraction

disputed / sanitized technical case study

A DeFi accounting case study involving mutable token-registry mappings and cross-chain bridge accounting. The research explored how a valid token remap could affect bridge-accounting buckets, AUM calculation, share pricing, and LP redemption behavior.

root_cause
Accounting state cached under mutable registry-derived token keys.
impact_class
Potential AUM / share-price corruption and LP value extraction risk.
View sanitized summary

evidence_type

  • Foundry PoCs
  • A/B control tests
  • Cross-chain accounting analysis
  • Production-style depositor / redeemer path
  • Share-price and AUM corruption analysis

skills_demonstrated

  • DeFi accounting review
  • Foundry testing
  • Invariant reasoning
  • Cross-chain system analysis
  • Technical reporting

Cosmos EVM — Staking Precompile Constructor Bypass

technically triaged · later closed under program eligibility policy

An EVM / precompile authorization bypass research case where a staking precompile attempted to block smart-contract callers using runtime code presence. The research focused on constructor-time EVM behavior, local-chain reproduction, and validator-management precompile boundaries.

root_cause
Authorization logic relied on runtime code presence, but constructor execution occurs before runtime bytecode is stored.
impact_class
Smart-contract caller restriction bypass and validator lifecycle manipulation risk, subject to staking and consensus constraints.
View sanitized summary

evidence_type

  • Go unit test
  • End-to-end local Cosmos EVM chain reproduction
  • Solidity exploit research
  • CREATE2 + SELFDESTRUCT lifecycle analysis
  • EIP-6780 behavior analysis
  • Published sanitized article

skills_demonstrated

  • EVM internals
  • Cosmos EVM precompile analysis
  • Go testing
  • Solidity exploit development
  • Local-chain reproduction
  • Responsible disclosure

Triaged, Reproduced, and Discarded

The story of a technically reproduced Cosmos EVM vulnerability, a triaged report, and the harsh reality of platform-driven bug bounty triage.

This research started with a simple question: where exactly is the boundary between the EVM execution environment and the Cosmos SDK state machine, and does every security assumption survive the crossing?

Instead of poking at public RPCs, I built the environment myself. I compiled the node software from source, patched the genesis configuration, enabled the relevant precompiles, and wrote Go tests around StateDB behavior so I could observe exactly what the chain believed about an account at every step of execution.

The core discovery came from understanding transient EVM execution phases. During deployment, a contract can look very different from a normal deployed contract — and an authorization check that assumes otherwise can be convinced it is talking to something it is not. I built a proof-of-concept and a full local reproduction showing that a smart contract could violate an explicit security policy, then expanded the research into a persistent lifecycle vector using deterministic deployment and same-transaction lifecycle behavior.

The report was triaged and reproduced. Later, it was closed under platform and program eligibility rules — not because the technical work was disproven. That distinction matters, and so does how a researcher responds to it. I chose not to publish weaponized exploit details, because responsible disclosure and user safety matter more than frustration.

The lesson I took from the whole process: documentation, methodology, and ethical boundaries are not the boring part of security research. They are the portfolio.

“Documentation is my true portfolio. The code, tests, and methodology are the proof.”

Read the full article ↗

AI Security Research

model / guardrails

Lunaris Guard v0.2 ↗

A ModernBERT-based dual-head classifier for real-time LLM guardrails. It produces injection and safety scores in a single forward pass, targeting prompt injection, jailbreaks, instruction overrides, unsafe content, and sensitive-data exfiltration patterns.

  • 248K+ training samples
  • 40+ languages
  • injection F1: 0.964
  • safety F1: 0.878
  • built for chat, RAG, and agent pipelines

model / guardrails

Lunaris Guard v0.1 ↗

The first public version of the Lunaris Guard prompt-injection and safety classifier, later improved in v0.2.

dataset / secops

Astraea Unified Threat Dataset v4 ↗

A 272K+ row multi-task cybersecurity dataset for log triage, IOC extraction, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, attack-chain classification, and phishing detection.

  • 272K+ rows
  • task-aware leakage-safe splits
  • IOC spans
  • MITRE mapping
  • cloud, EDR, IAM, Kubernetes, WAF, email, and network telemetry

model / secops

Lunaris Sentinel ↗

A multi-task security encoder fine-tuned from ModernBERT-base with separate heads for malicious/benign classification, MITRE technique classification, IOC token NER, and anomaly-score regression.

architecture / research

Lunaris MoC ↗

An experimental decoder-only Transformer architecture exploring sparse expert collaboration, iterative reasoning loops, and adaptive per-token compute allocation.

Contact

Have a codebase, junior role, or trial audit task? I am open to proving my ability through real research work.

telegram
@meryylle
location
Brazil
availability
Open to junior researcher, apprentice auditor, internship, contractor, or trial-based audit work.